The nuclear agreement signed by the United States and Saudi Arabia on the 22nd carries a 30-year term and a scale of tens of billions of dollars, significant enough to reshape the Middle East nuclear power market. The AP reported that, following joint research between the two countries, a uranium enrichment facility could be built in Saudi Arabia. However, President Trump immediately denied this, saying "there is no enrichment," and the Secretary of State also made clear that he would not reach any agreement carrying nuclear proliferation risks.
It is therefore premature to conclude that Saudi Arabia has obtained enrichment rights. This is likely why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that, with the contents of the agreement not yet disclosed, ascertaining the facts must come first. Weighing the pros and cons of the agreement is a matter for after the specific text has been confirmed.
Still, there is one thing that can be read even now, without the agreement text in hand. That is the grammar of the deal. According to the conditions known so far, a U.S. company will build the facility and the United States will manage the core technology. Added to this is the diplomatic condition that Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords. This means nuclear cooperation is not a favor of sharing technology, but a transaction accompanied by substantial cost and conditions.
Here we come face to face with one uncomfortable fact. Korea is a country that has already passed this test with a near-perfect score. The country that built the Barakah nuclear plant in the United Arab Emirates, a neighbor of Saudi Arabia, was Korea. The UAE included in its agreement the renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing, and nonproliferation experts still call this the "gold standard." Korea carried out the nuclear project while faithfully observing nonproliferation norms, but that faithfulness did not translate into a substantive expansion of Korea's authority.
Our position remains meager. Under the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement revised in 2015, Korea needs prior U.S. consent even to produce low-enriched uranium of less than 20%. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is also subject to strict limits, and the current agreement remains valid until 2035.
Of course, there have been opportunities for change. In a joint fact sheet released last November, the United States specified that it supports procedures that could lead to Korea's civilian uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. The two sides also agreed on cooperation related to the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, and the government formalized the "Jangbogo-N project," targeting a first launch in the mid-2030s.
However, Korea's plan to build the hull and reactor domestically and President Trump's wish to build them at the Philly Shipyard in the United States have yet to find common ground. Even the first round of consultations was held in Seoul only in June this year, seven months after the two countries reached their agreement. The second meeting, which was to be held in Washington, has yet to be scheduled.
So what is holding things back? First, there is a need to clear away the Coupang issue, which is often cited as the cause of the delay. The presidential office stated that security consultations are not being delayed because of the Coupang issue. National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac explained that the biggest pending issue between Korea and the United States is "investment," followed by the Coupang issue. This means Coupang is merely one of several points of contention and not an essential factor blocking the negotiations.
The essence is the pledge of 350 billion dollars in investment in the United States. Ambassador to the United States Kang Kyung-wha explained that the reason the investment execution is being delayed is that it takes time to find projects with commercial rationality. But the mood conveyed in diplomatic circles is far heavier than this.
Doubts over whether Korea has the will to faithfully implement the joint fact sheet are not easily being dispelled, and there are signs in various places that the United States is trying to link trade issues with security cooperation. Behind the stalled consultations over the nuclear agreement lies not the Coupang issue but distrust over Korea's implementation record.
The problem of perception is also difficult to overlook. In the U.S. conservative camp, an argument was raised through the pages of The Wall Street Journal last month that concerns over the Korea-U.S. alliance had grown since the current administration took office. Former U.S. ambassadors to Korea responded in rebuttal. Former Ambassador Philip Goldberg assessed that the current administration's foreign policy is closer to a diplomatic rebalancing than the pro-China policy that some in Washington see it as.
The truth may be closer to the latter assessment. But what determines cost at the negotiating table is not only objective truth, but the perception held by the other side. The fact that such perception is unfair or unjust does not make the negotiating cost disappear.
Time is not plentiful either. The government has set as its goal deriving a specific text before the U.S. midterm elections this November. If Washington's political landscape shifts after the election, there is a possibility that the negotiating momentum will weaken, or that the discussions will effectively have to start over from scratch.
At this point, there is a need to strip away the illusion. To the United States, Saudi Arabia is a customer providing an enormous nuclear power market, but Korea is a competitor capable of competing in the international nuclear power market. Handing over authority related to enrichment and reprocessing to a country that can design and build nuclear plants on its own is unlikely to align naturally with America's industrial interests.
Expecting the goodwill of the other side is not a strategy. Korea, too, must put substantive cards on the negotiating table. Shipbuilding cooperation, the visible execution of investment in the United States, long-term purchases of U.S. LNG, and joint development of small modular reactors must not be spent one by one as separate bargaining chips. Only by binding these into a single strategic package can the door to negotiations finally be opened.
Korea has faithfully observed international nonproliferation norms. But in international politics, compliance with rules does not in itself guarantee a reward. It only proves qualification to participate in negotiations. Turning that qualification into substantive authority is ultimately a matter of negotiation, and negotiation can advance only on the foundation of implementation records and trust.
The Saudi nuclear agreement is, for Korea, less an opportunity than a clock showing the time remaining. The second hand is already moving.
