Few countries can play as important a role as Korea in diversifying the world's clean energy supply chains. Korea holds world-class competitiveness in batteries, power grids, nuclear power, and electrical equipment. LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI, and SK On supply core battery cells, while Hyosung Heavy Industries, HD Hyundai Electric, and LS Electric secured more than $5 billion in power grid infrastructure orders in the first quarter of this year alone. As the expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) data centers coincides with demand to replace aging transmission networks, the strategic value of Korean electrical equipment companies is also growing.
Korea's nuclear power exports are also drawing attention as a realistic alternative to non-Russian nuclear power. Batteries, electric vehicles, solar, and wind are now no longer individual energy technologies but the power generation, storage, and conversion infrastructure on which AI, robotics, and advanced computing depend. President Lee Jae-myung's visits to India, Vietnam, and Europe also reflect the recognition that energy security, supply chain resilience, and industrial competitiveness cannot be separated.
The problem is that the world's clean energy supply chains remain excessively concentrated in specific countries. China accounts for 85% of the solar panel supply chain, 84% of battery cell production, and 74% of wind nacelle manufacturing. The International Energy Agency (IEA)'s "Energy Technology Perspectives 2026" report also points out that for most major supply chains, the removal of even a single largest supplier country would make it difficult to meet even a quarter of global demand. Korea, too, depends on China for a substantial portion of critical minerals such as rare earths.
The Korean government has strengthened cooperation in critical minerals, energy, and AI with India and Indonesia, and its energy supply chain talks with Vietnam, its push for a free trade agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU) and India, and the U.S.-led "Pax Silica" initiative are all part of the same trend. The diplomatic direction is clear.
The task ahead is to convert political commitments into actual investment and production capacity. Unfortunately, there is still a large gap in the process of turning each country's commitments into real investment and production.
In the United States, policy uncertainty has shaken investor confidence, leading to the cancellation or scaling back of $35 billion worth of clean energy projects in 2025 alone. SK On's $2.8 billion battery plant investment in Tennessee is a representative example that was scaled back and restructured after the dissolution of its joint venture structure with Ford.
The situation is not much different in the EU. It invested 27 billion euros in the battery sector in 2024, but relied on China for 87% of its supply volume. Northvolt went bankrupt in March 2025, and its Quebec gigafactory recorded a loss of $270 million without breaking ground.
Technological competitiveness alone is not enough. Stable raw material procurement, predictable policy, and reliable trade rules must all work together. A supply chain is not completed with a single factory. The ecosystem extending from mining, refining, materials, components, and cell manufacturing to grid connection and end demand must be interlocked.
Bridging the gap between political declarations and implementation requires a strong industrial strategy. Korea's battery technology and power grid capabilities exert greater power when combined with India's manufacturing base, the critical minerals of Australia and Canada, and the production capacity of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The NEIS Center works with partners in each country to support the policy, investment, and trade frameworks through which summit-level agreements attract private capital. Korea's strengths hold even greater strategic value within a coordinated international network. Global energy security ultimately begins with building such networks.
